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 France was again the target of jittery investors, 
worried its top AAA credit rating is at risk. 
Yields on its benchmark 10-year government 
bonds climbed and their spread over Germany’s 
equivalent bunds hit a record for the euro era. 
Paris said the risk premium was “not justified.”  
… Analysts warn it may well not be the steady 
sale usually expected from a country with a 
coveted AAA rating.
 “The price action in European monetary union 
(EMU) AAAs (excluding Germany) in the last 
few sessions clearly highlights that it is not about 
value in EMU AAAs at the moment. It is about 
fear and positioning,” said Jamie Searle at Citi.1 
One of the primary masks of capital is the naturaliza-
tion of its processes as inevitabilities. British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s language in the Autumn 
of 2008—that the global financial crisis “happened 
to us”—is testament to the rapid and strategic shifts 
in alliances of power and profit that support crisis 
economics. We were just in the wrong place at the 
wrong time; it was chance that it happened to us; it 
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was predetermined from above, and so on. The same 
heady mixture of belief and money—or, more precisely, 
naturalized urge camouflaging monetary transaction—
is evident in the art world when a collector buys or a 
dealer sells an artwork on the basis of an inexplicable 
and even capricious love. Just as “fear and position-
ing” now motivate the price action in the EMU, the 
same sensuous pathologization is evident in the elite 
mechanisms of art buying and selling. We argue that 
the love of art, here characterized as an ascendant 
property of art market transaction beyond the norma-
tive duties of care and control, is not simply a fetish 
but a powerful agent in the further redistribution of 
wealth, practiced in clear systemic collaboration with 
artists, curators, critics, and other actors in contem-
porary art’s infrastructure. As elaborated below, art is 
situated as an “alternative” commodity in part because 
of standard, received expectations of the personalities 
and passions of both artists (as quixotic, passionate, 
unpredictable) and their dealers and collectors (vari-
ously holding back ready stock from the market, not 
selling at the height of profit, etc.) The art market is in 
this sense peculiar not simply because it lacks trans-
parency because of its unregulated, opaque, and in-
efficient market but also because its trade is built on 
the impulsive and chancy gesture of love. As we shall 
see, such amorous/erotic transactions filter across the 
private to the public sector as museum and state-run 
galleries become increasingly reliant on the donations 
and bequests of private collectors in order to maintain 
both their permanent collections and temporary exhi-
bitions, thus significantly blurring the boundaries be-
tween state care and private passion. 
financialization of art
That such passions, chance encounters, and de-
cisions are irreducibly involved in the operations of 
the art market perhaps accounts for the relative fail-
ure of investment funds to rationalize it. In his com-
prehensive overview of recent developments in the 
contemporary art market Noah Horowitz remarks that 
the art fund industry “is not only emblematic of the 
enterprising new ways in which contemporary art is 
sold and experienced, … nor of how the art economy 
as a whole has embraced globalization; it is modern 
global finance embodied.”2 However, we learn over 
the ensuing pages that art investment funds—for 
which art is an “alternative asset class” to standard 
equities, shares, and bonds—have in fact not done 
very well over the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Such funds have generally failed to draw in in-
vestors, have “weak historical track records” on their 
returns, dissolve, or have closed down (in the case of 
Fernwood, one of the leading art funds, shutting shop 
because of suspected embezzlement by its CEO). 
These failures, together with the more general broken 
optimism for art investment funds, could be taken as 
an ironic confirmation that they did indeed embody 
“modern global finance” over the decade to 2008, not 
least in the leading role the global finance sector took 
in bringing about the systematic social and economic 
distress that has since ensued. 
In light of all this it may seem perplexing if not per-
verse to maintain that the art market can indeed be 
understood as the embodiment of finance. Not that 
this is Horowtiz’ claim: he remarks only that art invest-
ment funds are such embodiments even though, as 
we have seen, this is also why they have limited to no 
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success in establishing themselves in the art market. 
Yet, as we now argue, art does indeed embody the 
truth of finance, and it does so precisely in its failure 
or limitation as a kind of free-market investment. Pro-
posing as much not only allows the convergence of 
interests and operations of art (in particular contem-
porary art) and finance to be apprehended theoreti-
cally, it also reconfigures the significance of what is 
frequently heralded as the condition and satisfaction 
of its collectors: their love of art. 
Warranted though the acerbic identification of 
the failure of art investment funds with modern global 
finance may be, it leaves unexplained how and why 
art investment funds in particular did not live up to the 
promises made for them in the finance-led boom of 
the mid-2000s. Horowitz presents many of these in-
trinsic reasons, which arise mainly due to the particu-
larities of art as an investment. For example, it is highly 
illiquid (it cannot be quickly converted into money 
flows); it has many upfront and additional costs in-
cluding insurance, storage, handling, shipping, etc.; 
it does not pay dividends or returns over the time it is 
held by the investor, and so on. That art generates no 
earnings until its sale but has ownership costs makes 
it a “negative cash flow asset.”3 The particularities of 
art as an investment are not, however, limited to its 
material conditions and the requirements of preserva-
tion; they also arise from the specificities of its trad-
ing, which include “high transaction costs, … limited 
arbitrage opportunities,”4 and highly “opaque market 
information,” in that actual transaction prices are not 
openly advertised outside of auction resales of art 
(the secondary market) even as the manipulation of 
these prices by the artists’ dealers is a well-known 
part of such highly visible valuations. In other words, 
the ownership and trade of art is far from being 
the transparently- and openly-costed, easily-trans-
ferred, low-maintenance circulation of claims that 
modern global finance is built upon. On the one 
hand, this is the advantage it is supposed to pres-
ent to art investors, who look to profit from the high 
level of “asymmetrical information” offered by art’s 
“pricing inefficiencies”5—that is, they deploy to 
their advantage knowledge gained through closer 
involvement with art dealers. On the other hand, 
however, it means that art’s economy has a “weak 
pricing system” because it “lacks a single generally 
accepted valuation methodology,”6 such a method-
ology being a primary and constitutive assumption 
for the finance sector. 
There are two interconnected aspects to this 
weakness, one is theoretical-ideological, to which 
we later return, the other is sociological-institutional: 
that “art funds’ investment objective may be intrin-
sically flawed”7 because the free-market precepts 
core to such vehicles and their investors are in fact 
inapplicable to art. In Horowitz’ wry words: because 
such investment funds’ “vindication of art as an asset 
class is based so strongly upon free-trade economic 
theory, they may have underestimated the behavioral 
aversion of the market … towards such unabated 
speculation.”8 It is not only that the art market is 
averse to the standard pricing mechanisms constitu-
tive of modern global finance’s operations and pro-
cesses but, moreover, that art dealers’ “antispecula-
tive vehemence” makes for “sound business sense.”
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 In fact, dealers’ suppression of the economic 
[meaning here the free market principles under-
lying modern global finance] … may ultimately 
strengthen their financial prospects: collectors 
continue to do business with them because they 
trust their prices, and so the quality of their inven-
tory. … As goods leave the dealer’s inventory 
and extend beyond the network of collectors who 
comply with the first right of refusal, their control 
over supply diminishes—and with it, their 
monopolistic price control mechanism.9
“Antispeculative vehemence,” highly regulated trade, 
tight control mechanisms on ownership and subse-
quent resale; all of these standard business practices 
are how and why dealers “strengthen” their market 
share and are “commonly regarded” as better art 
investors than art investment fund managers.10 But 
if this is so it is because the methods and transac-
tional processes most successfully deployed in art’s 
commercial markets contravene in almost every way 
the free market principles and investment assump-
tions and patterns core to “modern global finance.” 
If such patterns are indeed embodied by art invest-
ment funds it is little surprise that they tend to fail so 
often or remain so modest. Equally, anti-speculative 
vehemence is intimately allied to the amorous/erotic 
involvement in art, widely flaunted in the acquisition 
of blue-chip art and the cloying discourses and be-
liefs of central figures in both public and private art 
sectors who support and rely upon such collectors. 
But such artworks—and therefore artists—are blue-
chip precisely because they return a consistently high 
price on both primary and secondary markets. This 
art is the “royalty” of the art market (just as the “blue” 
of blue-chip is said to derive from “blue blood”); the 
prizes in private and public art collections the world 
over (local cultural significations and traditions not-
withstanding). If you have a Picasso or a Warhol 
in your museum (currently and colloquially, the saf-
est bets, the bluest chips) you are likely to ride the 
storm of any market crash. Thus the game of betting 
is played by those who like to feign at gambling and 
have the means to do so. The term “blue-chip,” applied 
to companies that are regarded as “safe bets” on a 
stock exchange—corporations of any type that per-
form consistently well and operate profitably through 
ups and downs—is notably transferred to the informal 
“ratings” mechanisms of the art market, evidencing 
the relationship between luck and profit actualized in 
art investments. The term derives from poker, where 
a blue chip is valued higher than a red or white chip. 
Evidently, the game of chance, for those that can or 
must play it, transitions neatly across money actions, 
and the “safe bet” epitomizes in its “anti-speculative 
vehemence” the critical link between risk and aspira-
tion, the brag of profit and the depths of loss. 
The idea of a safe bet is, of course, a non-sequitur; 
wished for in all capital transactions, the safe bet is 
perhaps especially and dramatically apparent in the 
art market. Gambling on art is then only a specific 
type of investment, in which the passion of the game 
is matched by other passions—the love of art and the 
performative instantiation of that love on and through 
“buying action.” The titillation of such an ethos for 
the “civilian” onlooker is clear in the popularity of art 
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auction and art opening features in popular newspa-
pers and magazines, as well as in the sales of semi-
serious research publications giving an “insider” and 
interview-based account of dealing and collecting.11 
Such marketplace hagiographies attempt to make 
public the private world of art dealing, yet they isolate 
the privacy of monetary transaction to the shock and 
awe of numerology (in the sense that the cash figures 
are dramatically and thus mystically out of reach). It is 
these forms of action, private yet made public in the 
glare of gossip after art auctions (the secondary mar-
ket) and through rumor and the awarding of prestige 
and cultural capital through deals made with art gal-
leries and art consultants (primary market), that are 
under examination. 
Spending on blue-chip art—a practice already 
made paradoxical and thus separate from standard 
stock and share transactions through the concept 
of “safe betting”—ties the buyer into an interested 
bundle of socio-cultural mechanisms whereby the 
action of spending money is primarily seen as quix-
otic and impulsive, and only secondarily, if at all, 
as investment-based. Drawing on the research of 
Raymonde Moulin on the French art market and 
connoisseurship in the 1960s, Ulf Wuggenig points 
to the relation between amateurism, defined as 
the engagement in an activity for pleasure rather 
than profit, and love (amator—lover). Reflecting on 
Moulin’s interviews with collectors, and quoting 
Pierre Bourdieu, Wuggenig says, “their self image 
was that they collected not for instrumental reasons 
but for the ‘love of art’—and more particularly for the 
sort of ‘pure love’ that has its roots in the ideology 
of charisma; a love ‘irreducible to money and any ob-
jects of bourgeois interest.’”12
The centrality of this amorous ethos to the con-
centration of social and capital power in art of course 
relies upon and maintains the belief that while art is 
indeed traded on a market it is the very obstruction of 
that market to liberal free-market principles and prac-
tices that accords with an involvement in art itself. 
The art market is rather a market of “care,” deemed to 
be appropriate to art because art itself is decontami-
nated from capital accumulation.13 Through art and 
the love of art, wealth and power excuse themselves; 
they demonstrate their ethos of human passions over 
that of money. Interviewing the art consultant Philippe 
Ségalot about how he finds and matches the right 
artwork to a buyer, Sarah Thornton asks:
 How does Ségalot know when he has encoun-
tered the right work? “You feel something,” he 
says with fervour. “I never read about art. I’m not 
interested in the literature about art. I get all the 
art magazines, but I don’t read them. I don’t want 
to be influenced by the reviews. I look. I fill myself  
with images. It is not necessary to speak so 
much about art. I am convinced that a great work 
speaks for itself.” A faith in gut instinct is common 
to most collectors, consultants and dealers, and 
they love to talk about it.14
The asymmetrical shape of the art market is concomi-
tant with the collector being a lover. This in turn ren-
ders the market one of passion—a passion built on 
the eroticism of impulsive taste and fueled by dealers 
financialization of art suhail malik/andrea phillips
218 219
and consultants formulating that love competitively. 
Such incalculable passion is the avowed ethos not 
just of the agents in the art market but of art’s insti-
tutionalization more generally; it is the identifying as-
sumption as to why one would be involved in art at all. 
But while it is relatively easy to characterize the impul-
sive collector as a pathological subject, or the aggre-
gate movements of the art market to be of behavioral 
rather than rational economics,15 a more complicated 
and more urgent issue is the relation between the 
convenience of that pathology (the irrational collector 
who bankrupts him or herself in the name of love for a 
particular artist’s work, for example) and the method 
of accumulation as it is signaled by art’s price. Our 
interest is precisely the logic of the relation between 
the art market’s price-setting mechanisms and the 
evident “irrationality” of art’s pricing in relation to pro-
duction costs or other supposed “real” bases for pric-
ing. We aim here to remove the (proto-ideological) 
support for the decontamination of power through 
art’s ethos, which is no less a moral-affective support 
for finance gained by the separation in principle of 
economy (price), social order, and art, the rationality 
of one being opposed to the irrationality of the other.
The rationality of the liberal markets and the art mar-
ket’s countermanding of it are central to the more 
theoretically-ideologically situated aspect of art’s 
“weak pricing system.” Not only are art prices on the 
primary market set “monopolistically,” but these prices 
do not observe the basic diktats of modern economic 
theory: “art investors cannot simply determine the dis-
counted value of its future cash flows, as is common 
place in the equity and real estate markets”16—or in-
deed any conventional pricing calculation deployed 
in liberal economic theory. As Jonathon Nitzan and 
Shimshon Bichler explain, this formula “tells us how 
much a capitalist is prepared to pay now”—the price—
“to receive a flow of money later,” reducing “a future 
stream of earnings to their present value.”17 For Nitzan 
and Bichler “capitalization” is defined by the process 
of “reducing” earnings to their present value together 
with the ordering of that which is thus priced.18 In con-
trast to the supposed universal salience of this pric-
ing formula, which is core to neoclassical economic 
dogma, art has no basis for its future earnings other 
than speculative guesses. The best the art buyer can 
do is “make an educated bet that the price of an art-
work may rise in the future, but calculating such gains 
is hardly a perfect science”19—hence the problematic 
relation between investment fund strategies, which as-
sume such pricing formulas, and art market dealings, 
which decry them. Contrary to this apparently irreduc-
ible incongruity, Nitzan and Bichler propose that the 
neoclassical formulation of price is itself a falsehood 
if not a mystification. The unsurmountable problem it 
faces is that since expected earnings are gained in the 
future, those earnings and therefore the rate of return 
are in fact unknown and only speculative expectations. 
Furthermore, since the expected rate of return is cal-
culated on the basis of future earnings, it is not even 
known if variables in this “elementary” calculation of 
capitalization are interrelated or not. The core formula 
for the neoclassical price-setting model thus says 
nothing to the content or relation of its determinants. 
Or then price. In other words, standard price-setting is 
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never in fact the “discount value of future cash flows.” 
While the pretence that price can be calculated 
on the basis of discounted earnings can be mostly 
maintained by reference to a “real economy” of earn-
ings, debts, production, and so on—all of which can 
be called upon as a supposed basis for calculating 
“future earnings” and “rates of return”—its actual im-
plausibility is wholly apparent in art’s price-setting, as 
Horowitz recognizes. In other words, the price-setting 
of art reveals capitalization as such, without the le-
gitimizing, retro-fitted measurements and theories 
seeking to justify earnings on the basis of production 
(Marxism) or consumption (neoclassical liberalism). 
That is, the art market demonstrates the truth of all 
price-setting: that there is no basis in production or 
consumption for pricing, only capitalization. In itself, 
this result is hardly news: art prices cannot be ratio-
nalized by reference to production.20 But its deriva-
tion from Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of capitalization 
brings with it two important corollaries, which return 
to the sociological-institutional conditions of art and 
its market:
(i) 
 If art prices are explicitly financially generated 
without reference to production, they make 
manifest the condition of all price-setting, or 
what could be called capital’s procedural and 
operational “fincanciality” (the term is not Nitzan 
and Bichler’s). Financiality here designates that 
finance is a primary condition for, rather than con-
sequence of, capitalization and price-setting and 
that, as such, price and capital are not predicated 
on production, use-value, consumption, or other 
bases external to finance.21 It is not then that art 
pricing is a puzzle compared to other, produc-
tive or consuming, sectors of the economy, but 
that the art market dispels their obscuring of 
capitalization as the primary determinant of price 
(which is also why its price-setting mechanisms 
present such a practical and theoretical difficulty 
to neoclassical and Marxian (NCM) accounts). 
For Horowitz, the only tendentious salience of 
standard theories of price-setting to art is the fact 
that art has a “weak pricing system.” And while it 
is indeed “weak” from the perspective  
of the neoclassical precepts to which  
Horowitz subscribes, it is for just that reason  
a pronounced example of the conditions of  
capitalization as Nitzan and Bichler account for 
it, namely that “all capital is finance and only fi-
nance.”22
(ii) 
 As Horowitz observes, interest from regular  
financial investment funds in the art market  
tends to go rather badly thanks to the  
“monopolistic price control mechanisms” of the 
primary market. Nitzan and Bichler’s notion of 
capitalization, however, proposes that such mo-
nopolistic price controls are not the exception 
in price-setting but the standard. In particular, 
the primary market is only a trenchantly orga-
nized market of “administered prices” that are 
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usual business practice. Administered prices 
stabilize earnings on the basis of the markup on 
their wares.23 As for the primary art market, such 
prices are set by highly concentrated and often 
colluding businesses and sectors. More exactly, 
administered prices are a form of control over 
prices and represent the “degree of monopoly” 
of the firm over the market. Horowitz’ remark is 
then a recognition from inside the neoclassical 
paradigm that the primary market is one of admin-
istered prices. 
That capitalism’s financiality is independent of its pu-
tative justification of production is, however, only a 
partial result in Nitzan and Bichler’s larger and more 
general claim, which they make following Thorstein 
Veblen’s distinction between generalized social pro-
duction (industry) and private ownership (business). 
Industry is “an integrated creative process whose 
productivity derives from the totality of its purpose-
ful resonating pulses,”24 the latter phrase meaning 
the integrated effects of production across society. 
Business, on the other hand, is the “power process 
carried out through the prerogatives of ownership.”25 
For Nitzan and Bichler the primary question core to all 
capital accumulation is “how does private ownership 
‘generate’ earnings?”26 They note that the etymology 
of private is from the Latin privatus, “restricted,” and 
related to privare, “to deprive.” Private ownership is 
for them the “power principle of capitalism” not be-
cause “it enables those who own” but because, as 
just noted, “it disables those who do not.” To use 
their local example, not being able to transfer Warren 
Buffet’s assets to anyone at all is an issue of ownership 
not technical limitation. In more general terms, private 
ownership is the condition of capitalism because “it is 
wholly and only an institution of exclusion, and institu-
tional exclusion is a matter of organized power.” What 
is key here is that ownership is not productive per se 
since it “has no bearing” on industry intrinsically, and 
certainly does not add to it. Industry and business are 
different in kind. But business can profit by gaining an 
advantage over industry it does not own by damaging 
it, and thereby lowering the maximization of industry 
overall. Sabotage is then the condition and actuality 
of capital earnings. Furthermore, since business capi-
tal necessarily sabotages industry, capital is then not 
just sometimes unproductive with regard to industry 
but is necessarily counterproductive.27 In stark con-
trast to the shared tenets of NCM paradigms, capital 
always lessens industry rather than profiting from its 
increase: “the only way for capitalists to profit from 
productivity is by subjugating it and limiting it. And 
since business earnings hinge on strategic sabotage, 
their capitalization represents nothing but incapacita-
tion.”28 Sabotage is the shaping of generalized indus-
try, ordering it to specific and particular interests; it is 
a technique of concentrating power. As such, capital-
ization is a social ordering for the sake of privatized 
earnings and is therefore directly power. Economy 
is then always and necessarily a political economy; 
there are no “free” markets.
While this general result holds for art as it does 
for anything else that is capitalized, what is specific 
about art’s financiality is that because art prices are 
set with reference to nothing but its financiality and 
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as its market is so highly administered, art prices 
explicitly demonstrate the ordering and sabotage of 
general production by and for private earnings.29 Art 
prices are unequivocal instantiations of capital-power 
without any recourse to socio-political accountability. 
In these terms, the difference between art’s primary 
and secondary markets is that such sabotaging capi-
talization—the degree of monopoly, the concentration 
of institutionalized power—is greater in the primary 
market, while the demonstration of sabotage is more 
overt in the secondary market. These two aspects are 
in no sense contradictory nor do they even contravene 
one another as in the “Hostile Worlds” scenario in 
which art and money do not touch, identified by Olav 
Velthuis to be commonly mobilized by agents defend-
ing the monopoly of the primary market against the 
encroachments of the secondary, often by recourse 
to the impassioned ethos of the former.30 Rather, both 
markets are effectively mobilized together to further 
increase the total and specific “degrees of monopoly” 
of capital power. This result accords with the obser-
vation that for all the drama concerning the shifting 
power and positioning of the two markets with re-
gard to one another, in practice both are deployed by 
the same agents as part of their standard business 
operations; and, that the degree of monopoly over 
prices is never really weakened by competitive sales 
but only differently administered (art does not com-
pete against other art in arriving at its price; it is only 
ever a question of the markup).
Identifying art’s financiality with sabotage enables 
yet further characteristic features of art’s current in-
stitutional ethos to be systematically accounted for: 
—  Since sabotage is a necessarily social act 
of institutional ordering and exclusive priva-
tion, capitalization cannot be analytically or 
practically separated from social organization. 
In particular, wealth accumulation is not ana-
lytically or practically distinct from symbolic, 
cultural and technical power. The integrity of 
political economy proposed by Nitzan and  
Bichler’s theory of capital power thus  
dispenses with the explanatory categories 
established by Pierre Bourdieu of symbolic 
or cultural capital, or of direct and indirect 
capital, which presume a difference in kind 
between economic capital and social capital 
where the latter is mobilized in the service 
of the former.31 Rather, and as art clearly in-
stantiates, prices are correlated at once and 
necessarily with cultural or symbolic institution-
alization. “Values” of many kinds are intimately 
coordinated in a nexus or complex that inte-
grates meaning and its (dis)establishment, “in-
tellectual property,” social status, money, price-
setting mechanisms, and so on. Art prices thus 
rescind the “Nothing But” paradigm, in which 
the value of art is determined simply and exclu-
sively by its price.32
—  Art’s marketization is constituted by its finan-
ciality, without reference to its production, or 
the basis for production, or even its products. 
In particular, art’s marketization is not an issue 
of commodification, or of art’s content. The 
influential Marxian disputes on this identifica-
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tion result from an anxious recognition of the 
historical error of art’s commodity status in 
contradistinction to another kind of production 
that would somehow free it from its marketi-
zation. In this they base art in production—
perhaps even the generalized production of 
industry at large—and look to surpass art’s 
financiality for this reason. However, capital-
ization qua sabotage is wholly indifferent to 
production: it makes no odds to capitaliza-
tion how or why production takes place, only 
that some production is to be institutionally 
affirmed and others sabotaged (thus reduc-
ing industry overall). Whether or not art is a 
commodity is no issue for its capitalization, the 
question having no traction on its financiality.
—  Similarly, looking to the (individual or collective) 
artist as the basis and condition of art in 
need of support against the depredations of 
marketization and institutionalization (inflicted 
by those very markets and institutions) is an 
appeal to a return to production as the basis 
for art’s value. When such appeals act as a 
moral vindication of the ethos of art’s financial-
ity (selling the artist’s work is for the benefit of 
the artist), the artist acts a compensatory fable 
for the continued sabotage art’s institutional 
capitalization inflicts on general production. 
Art’s amorous ethos looks to individualize and 
give alibi to ownership-sabotage by configur-
ing the artist as a unique producer of original 
works who, on the basis of their putative  
autonomy, is then a legitimizing figure of highly 
monopolistic production that is itself emblem-
atic of the configuration of business-sabotage 
contra social industry. 
—  The now standard critique proposing art to be 
irreducible to capital and the latter’s culture 
because of art’s unproductivity, dejection, 
non-perfomance, failure, useless expenditure, 
and so on (in short, the Adornian-Beckettian-
Bataillean repertoire) advocates a cultural  
determination of art qua sabotage. Accepting  
this “Hostile Worlds” paradigm of art comple-
ments art’s financiality even as these counter-
capitalist theories claim to contend it. These 
institutionally stable discourses thus take a 
leading role in the justification and legitima-
tion—the remoralization—of institutional 
sabotage, most notable perhaps in the sup-
port they give to the highly concentrated 
monopolies of art already in place and the 
prevailing social power represented thereby. 
The continuity of interests between financiality 
and such prevalent critical claims is evidenced 
by the their centrality in the marketization of art 
through theoretically-informed journalism.
If it’s a commonplace that art’s financiality damages 
a more general proliferation of “art” simply because 
the art market excludes more art than it includes, the 
analysis proposed here offers a different, specific 
determination of the damage inflicted by art’s finan-
ciality: it is a sabotage of art as a part of general 
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production, as industry. Art’s price indexes the power 
of such sabotage in the terms set out by that sabo-
tage. Art’s capitalization is not then predicated on 
aesthetic-artistic determinations but sociological-
financial power; or, at least, the power concerns of 
institutional capitalization determine its aesthetic- 
artistic interests. Art’s amorous/erotic ethos is a cru-
cial medium of transmission between the two: the im-
plementation of power-sabotage is authorized by the 
common yet unaccountable enactment of the love of 
art, which in any given case is an irreducible element. 
Such institutional power is on the one hand fashion 
within art, in which every party looks to every other for 
an unaccountable and otherwise criteria-less valida-
tion of what counts as worthwhile art. And on the other 
hand it is the prevailing institutional insistence on 
presenting work of putative “quality” and “value.” The 
assumed obviousness (and consequent consent) 
enforced by such terms inflicts in morally protected 
form the social sabotage of a power that need not 
account for itself but is simply occasioned by its claims 
on/through art. 
The love for art declared not only by collectors but 
also by any of its agents is the subjective, privatized 
account of such a morally protected sabotage power. 
It is an ethos. While such power equal to capitaliza-
tion, and thus finance, is perhaps most evident with 
the collector-dealer nexus, where monetary transac-
tions are most palpable, it is by no means restricted 
to these actors since capitalization is a matter of gen-
eral social ordering organized through private owner-
ship. The reorganization of power legitimized through 
art’s amorous ethos has both subjective and public 
aspects of its privatization, which are interrelated. The 
subjective account requires one last visit to the deri-
vation of price-setting as institutional sabotage. 
Given that art has “little intrinsic worth” in terms of 
material costs,33 art’s financiality is only another way of 
saying that prices are set almost entirely by its mark-
up.34 If one of the standard puzzles in art-pricing is how 
to justify prices in “fundamentals” beyond hype and 
risk, Nitzan and Bichler’s derivation of pricing suggests 
that prices in general have no foundation in objective 
conditions such as production but are predicated only 
on convention (historical earnings and a standard rate 
of return) and a subjectively determined speculative 
zeal or positioning, which is a trade-off between hype 
and risk above a standard rate of return.35 Moreover, 
while the sabotage business inflicts upon industry in 
general is a consequence of sectorial-collective sabo-
tage (outlined above for art as the appeal to “quality” 
and “excellence”), that sabotage is nonetheless un-
dertaken for earnings made by private ownership and 
is exclusively against industry. There is then a private, 
subjective correlate to the sectorial sabotage of capi-
talization and, in particular, its positioning. When spec-
ulative zeal is low (hype is low or outweighed by the 
risk coefficient)—as when markets contract or, with 
art, the speculative interest is directed towards art that 
is not secured by power (or reputation, another name 
for sectorial sabotage)—the general name for this pri-
vate, subjective correlate is fear. When hype is high 
or outweighs risk—when positioning is highly positive, 
as it is with blue-chip art—the received name in art’s 
ethos for the private subjective dimension of sabotage 
is love. Love completes the logic of the privatizing 
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sabotage of production in general; it is the confirmation 
of power over the social order through capitalization 
pursued through institutions. Love is but the private, 
subjective—and therefore capricious, owned—posi-
tive positioning of art’s capitalization.
The love of art is thus still a “source of legitimacy” 
for empire-making allied to capitalization; it is how 
sabotage can be privately and publicly vindicated.36 
Looking at the recent history of this socio-cultural 
privatization, the political economy of culture, in Eu-
rope and North America, it is clear that the hierarchies 
ascribed through such territory-building projects have 
dissipated to a major extent through the reorganization 
of fiscal power mechanisms at a transnational scale, 
prioritizing revenue for the type of finance that works 
beyond the simple philanthropic, charitable gestures 
of previous decades, and beyond the clear territorial-
ization of ownership. Love has no borders. Playing the 
risky game of buying and selling art not for profit but 
because you love art and are perhaps addicted to its 
irrationalities and impulses in some way is a sure fire 
method of distracting a public gaze, which accepts the 
distinction between capitalization and love, from ques-
tions concerning the deep inequalities caused by your 
wealth accumulation or indeed the investments you 
may make in order to produce that wealth. Such dis-
connection between normative investment and return 
methodologies and the practices of the contemporary 
art market leave stranded a welfare state model of pub-
lic art beneficence, which the funders are simply un-
able (though of course not unwilling—in fact have no 
choice but) to compete with. This suggests a marked 
shift in the modes through which art is distributed and 
displayed, and accounts for much of the pandering and 
groveling that takes up an increasing percentage of the 
time of all publicly-funded galleries and museums. The 
sheer fact that “public” art museums and galleries in 
many parts of the world are now being predominantly 
funded by private donation attests to this. Once the im-
brication of private patronage in spaces once deemed 
ideologically public is complete it becomes clear that 
contemporary art, its production and curation, be-
comes an advanced mechanism of experimentation for 
the sabotage of (ideologies of) access and equality. 
Taking art’s institutional capitalization to be a mode of 
sabotage vectored/legitimized through an amorous/
erotic ethos then permits a number of medium-term 
future scenarios for the political economy of art and 
the privatization of care to be anticipated. Though 
practically-integrated, these transformations can be 
thematically demarcated as follows:
I 
capital  
 Despite the claims of the art investment sector 
that it is counter-cyclical or uncorrelated to the 
movements of broad equities markets, the art 
market is entirely dependent on the available 
cash flows or liquidity available to higher-income 
earners.37 Two schematic scenarios can then be 
put forward for the decade from 2012, depend-
ing on the fate of the finance sector and private 
wealth accrual in the period.
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(i)
  an increase in liquidity (which is not to say  
a strengthening of wider economies) will 
strengthen the art market, which will be most  
ostentatiously marked by escalating prices for 
blue-chip work. The “Hostile Worlds” scenario 
between primary and secondary markets will 
be resurrected, but as mock-battles because 
all sides will increase the power of art’s institu-
tional capitalization against (art’s) industry. The 
characteristic ethos of art will concentrate power 
with even greater degrees of monopoly to those 
who are most able to love art subjectively—that 
is, without care for what that love means, how it 
is constituted, and what it more generally reorga-
nizes. The period of the art market slump, 2009–
201X, will be seen as a valuable “correction” in 
an otherwise continually developing market of 
privately recognized “quality” and “excellence.” 
Dominant art institutions will exacerbate this 
concentration of power.
(ii) 
 Fragile or thinning liquidity in the coming period 
will result in a contraction of the total market, 
again putatively intensifying a conflict between 
primary and secondary markets but increasing 
their co-dependency to secure a shrinking capital 
base. In this scenario, power will again be con-
centrated but the appeal to subjectively private 
love as its legitimizing ethos will probably be less 
prevalent as art will seek to gain greater moral 
value in order to stabilize capitalization in terms 
other than those of wealth accumulation. Here, 
terms such as “quality” and “excellence” will be 
contested as public-collective (moral) claims 
rather than privatized gain, but will again, for this 
reason of securing power, mark the sabotaging 
institutionalization and marketization of art.
II 
institutional infrastructure 
 It’s said that you can’t help who (or what?) you 
fall in love with. In loving art and playing safe bets, 
modern and contemporary art collectors mask, 
inadvertently or not, their worldly dealings. Soci-
ologies of collecting, whilst often focusing either 
on museums and patronage or the oddities of 
obsessive collectors of everyday objects, throw 
light on the relation between collecting and forms 
of domination, but they do so under the terms of a 
type of statist thinking that the buyers and sellers 
of contemporary art now move far beyond. John 
Elsner and Roger Cardinal, for example, propose 
that “if the peoples and the things of the world are 
collected, and if the social categories into which 
they are assigned confirm the precious knowl-
edge of culture handed down through genera-
tions, then our rulers sit atop a hierarchy of collec-
tors.”38 The rise of the private museum, its public 
accessibility, its collection built on the impulsive 
and quixotic taste of its owner (in fact advised by 
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a group of arts consultants and public museum 
directors hoping to gather some crumbs), attests 
to a pathological and political shift from a culture 
of care to a culture of love within the dominant 
structures of neoliberal states.39 If care is what 
the state-funded arts were supposed to do, either 
through psychic and experiential transformations 
of the viewer or through participation in programs 
of community cohesion, such narratives of amelio-
ration and healing of publics have been replaced 
by privatized love. The private collector, making 
his or her mark, through the use and abuse of his/
her own passions by trading art, no longer does 
so on the basis of a public’s expectation of benefit 
(he is not doing it to “do good”). This is not the 
field of patronage developed in the industrial age 
of Europe and North America. Instead of a gen-
eral commitment to care (however homogenized 
and hierarchized this system of care was), private 
art buyers care for their own passions and then 
allow the public to see glimpses of them though 
the gauze of mediators, arts consultants, and the 
like. Rather than be understood as a neo-feudal 
arrangement, here the previously state-organized 
public is demanded to share in the love of art 
on the terms of private corporatism. The new 
museum (The New Museum?) is identified as a 
location in which any civilian can participate—
publicly—in the spectacle of elite spending, doing 
so in the sharing or appreciation of a privatized 
love. This endemic configuration of people, space, 
and shared but unequal love will be the ever more 
prevalent shape of public galleries and museums 
over at least the next two decades as this type of 
inventive public-private methodology becomes in-
creasingly necessary to maintain institutions in the 
wake of the decline of state funding for culture.
III 
reputational venues  
 If privatized sabotage becomes more prominent as 
the organizing principle of art and its institutional-
ization, then institutional capitalization and its  
attendant prestige- and reputation-building of art 
will shift more decisively to overt market-based 
organization—notably, from biennials to art fairs. 
Given the importance of prioritizing subjective 
positioning as a condition for art’s institutional 
capitalization, and the importance of providing 
an ersatz public service, these procedures of 
legtimization are not conducted through the vend-
ing formats and venues themselves but the prolif-
eration of off-site projects (entry to which is only 
sometimes charged). Such projects rely upon the 
veneer of a “Hostile Worlds” scenario internal to 
the primary market itself, allowing the love of art 
“for its own sake” to continue to be materialized 
and specified at precisely the point of its most 
intense sites of marketization. If the availability of 
such art fair project programs to the public is a 
leading factor in their presentation, the transforma-
tion of state-level organization by capitalization and 
its private solace again comes to the fore.  
The availability of art to a (bourgeois) public was 
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the task of the national museum and, in post-war  
Europe, the biennial, overcoded as these were 
by a pedagogic-formative command typical of 
modernizing industrial nation-states seeking (to 
project) a public base. The art fair project re-
places this complex network of institutional and 
social care, in which culture and art might have 
acted as vectors of common identification, with 
the eliciting and adulation of private excitements; 
a dab of knowledge-generation in such projects 
allows them to also take on the mantel of cultural 
education from that previous formation. Yet what 
is public here is not a common or collective task 
but subjective positioning, the power of private, 
speculative zeal we are all permitted to occasion-
ally taste. 
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